Lockdown Effects on Sars-CoV-2 Transmission – The Evidence from Northern Jutland (preprint)

The exact impact of lockdowns and other NPIs on Sars-CoV-2 transmission remain a matter of debate as early models assumed 100% susceptible homogenously transmitting populations, an assumption known to overestimate counterfactual transmission, and since most real epidemiological data are subject to massive confounding variables. Here, we analyse the unique case-controlled epidemiological dataset arising from the selective lockdown of parts of Northern Denmark, but not others, as a consequence of the spread of mink-related mutations in November 2020. Our analysis shows that while infection levels decreased, they did so before lockdown was effective, and infection numbers also decreased in neighbour municipalities without mandates. Direct spill-over to neighbour municipalities or the simultaneous mass testing do not explain this. Instead, control of infection pockets possibly together with voluntary social behaviour was apparently effective before the mandate, explaining why the infection decline occurred before and in both the mandated and non-mandated areas. The data suggest that efficient infection surveillance and voluntary compliance make full lockdowns unnecessary at least in some circumstances.

Lockdown Effects on Sars-CoV-2 Transmission - The evidence from Northern Jutland (preprint)

The exact impact of lockdowns and other NPIs on Sars-CoV-2 transmission remain a matter of debate as early models assumed 100% susceptible homogenously transmitting populations, an assumption known to overestimate counterfactual transmission, and since most real epidemiological data are subject to massive confounding variables. Here, we analyse the unique case-controlled epidemiological dataset arising from the selective lockdown of parts of Northern Denmark, but not others, as a consequence of the spread of mink-related mutations in November 2020. Our analysis shows that while infection levels decreased, they did so before lockdown was effective, and infection numbers also decreased in neighbour municipalities without mandates. Direct spill-over to neighbour municipalities or the simultaneous mass testing do not explain this. Instead, control of infection pockets possibly together with voluntary social behaviour was apparently effective before the mandate, explaining why the infection decline occurred before and in both the mandated and non-mandated areas. The data suggest that efficient infection surveillance and voluntary compliance make full lockdowns unnecessary at least in some circumstances.

This Time is Different? - On the Use of Emergency Measures During the Corona Pandemic (preprint)

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only caused hundreds of thousands to die and millions to lose their jobs, it has also prompted more governments to simultaneously declare a state of emergency than ever before. States of emergency usually imply the extension of executive powers that diminishes the powers of other branches of government, as well as to the civil liberties of individuals. Here, we analyze whether the use of emergency provisions during the COVID-19 pandemic is an exception, and find that this is not the case. In fact, some measures point at long-term dangers to the rule of law and democracy. We also explicitly control for the use of executive decrees and find that many executives perceive of executive decrees as a substitute for states of emergency.

16 Possible Factors for Sweden’s High COVID Death Rate among the Nordics (preprint)

What accounts for Sweden’s high COVID death rate among the Nordics? One factor could be Sweden’s lighter lockdown. But we suggest 15 other possible factors. Most significant are:(1) the “dry-tinder” situation in Sweden (we suggest that this factor alone accounts for 25 to 50% of Sweden's COVID death toll); (2) Stockholm’s larger population; (3) Sweden’s higher immigrant population; (4) in Sweden immigrants probably more often work in the elderly care system; (5) Sweden has a greater proportion of people in elderly care; (6) Stockholm’s “sport-break” was a week later than the other three capital cities; (7) Stockholm’s system of elderly care collects especially vulnerable people in nursing homes. Other possible factors are: (8) the Swedish elderly and health care system may have done less to try to cure elderly COVID patients;(9) Sweden may have been relatively understocked in protective equipment and sanitizers; (10) Sweden may have been slower to separate COVID patients in nursing homes; (11) Sweden may have been slower to implement staff testing and changes in protocols and equipage; (12) Sweden elderly care workers may have done more cross-facility work; (13) Sweden might have larger nursing homes; (14) Stockholmers might travel more to the Alpine regions; (15) Sweden might be quicker to count a death "a COVID death.” We give evidence for these other 15 possible factors. It is plausible that Sweden’s lighter lockdown accounts for but a small part of Sweden’s higher COVID death rate.

Did Lockdown Work? An Economist’s Cross-Country Comparison (preprint)

I explore the association between the severity of lockdown policies in the first half of 2020 and mortality rates. Using two indices from the Blavatnik Centre’s Covid 19 policy measures and comparing weekly mortality rates from 24 European countries in the first halves of 2017-2020, and addressing policy endogeneity in two different ways, I find no clear association between lockdown policies and mortality development.